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Introduction 
The movement for democratic reform in Egypt 
seems to be gathering strength. Some of the 
factors that would make a good case for 
democratic transformation are rapidly 
converging: the formation of a wide spectrum of 
discontented segments in society; the 
mushrooming of pro-reform grass-roots 
movements that agree on a clear list of short-
term demands; and a sympathetic pro-reform 
international context. With presidential and 
parliamentary elections scheduled to take place 
in September and November respectively, will 
Egypt finally experience its democratic spring? 
The answer to this question still seems 
uncertain. The reform movement faces 
numerous challenges: the possibility of being 
sidelined by an agreement between the regime 
and external actors for the sake of stability and 
containing change; regime repression of the 
reform movement; and the radicalisation of the 
movement itself and the possible eruption of 
sporadic violence or chaos. For reform to 
become a reality and not another missed 
opportunity, certain structural changes and 
institutional safeguards must be introduced.  
Mounting discontent 
Several developments at the beginning of 2005 
sent clear signals that the year would be a 
difficult one for the Egyptian government. The 
regime has become a target for internal and 
external pressures to undertake qualitative 
democratic reforms. The pro-reform forces in the 
country became determined to publicly and 
forcefully challenge the regime’s attempts to 
circumvent reform and outmanoeuvre the 
growing demands for ending the state of 
emergency, amending the constitution and 
allowing for a competitive presidential election. In 
an attempt to avert these pressures, the governing 
National Democratic Party (NDP) held a conference 
in September 2004 to launch its new vision for the 
country and propose ways to activate political life. 
But the NDP congress came as a big disappointment 
to the opposition, whose demands were all rejected. 
The party insisted on setting its own reform agenda by 
giving priority to economic reforms and proposing minor 
political changes to some of the existing laws. In fact, the 
congress refused to even discuss the possibility of 
amending the constitution, changing the rules of the 
presidential elections or lifting the state of emergency. 
Instead, it focussed on superficial changes to the laws on 
party formation, public assembly and the practice of 
political rights. All the changes proposed sought to 
reinforce the party’s grip over the pace of political reform. 
It became obvious that the regime chose to derail the 
democratic reforms. Most alarming was the fact that the 
country was being prepared for a hereditary succession of 
power. President Hosni Mubarak, who is the head of the 
party, did not participate in the congress proceedings, 
except for the concluding session. The president’s son, 
Gamal Mubarak, who also heads the party’s Policies 
Committee, received wide publicity and most of the 
attention during the congress, as he appeared to be 
spearheading the reforms and the ‘reformist wing’ within 
the party. He assumed the role of explaining the party’s 
plans, outlining the government’s future vision and 
restructuring the party to increase the presence and 
influence of his own clients, the party’s ‘new guards’. As 
the presidential elections were at that time only one year 
down the road, and despite official denials, it became 
clear that the way would be open for Gamal Mubarak to 
become Egypt’s next hereditary president – a scenario 
that all the pro-reform forces in the country vehemently 
reject and are willing to resist. 
Another discernable development this year concerns the 
extent of the opposition to the regime’s agenda. The 
spectrum of pro-reform movements has been expanding 
daily and has become wide enough to include a diversity 
of activists such as university students, professors, 
lawyers, doctors, engineers and journalists – and perhaps 
for the first time – judges and Azharite scholars. Strangely 
enough, through its reluctance to change and 
unresponsive policies the government has managed to 
alienate almost all of these groups, who have begun to 
feel that the fulfilment of their demands is directly linked 
to a larger process of reform.  
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The case of Egypt’s judges is worth elaborating upon 
because it could have significant political ramifications in 
the future. Traditionally, the judges have deliberately 
refrained from interfering in politics or taking a public 
political stand in order to ensure the independence and 
neutrality of the judicial branch. Yet last April, judges 
finally joined the movement and stressed the need for 
overall reforms. They pressed the government for certain 
demands in return for their supervision of the upcoming 
presidential and parliamentary elections. These demands 
included approving a new law for the judicial branch 
(which they had proposed but the regime had been 
stalling since 1991), to ensure complete independence of 
the judiciary from government interference. They insisted 
on their full supervision over the entire electoral process, 
from the preparation of the lists of voters to the 
announcement of the election results. The judges have 
been outspoken about past election irregularities and 
expressed their determination not to participate in future 
elections that could be rigged. Their stand received 
support from various organisations – representing 
lawyers, journalists, engineers, workers, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Egyptian Movement for Change, 
known as the ‘Kifaya  [Enough]’ movement, which 
consider the complete independence of the judiciary and 
its total supervision over the elections as a necessary 
safeguard for a democratic transition and the future of 
reform in the country. 
Pro-reform movements from the grass-roots level 
Egyptian political life has for a long time been 
monopolised by an over-dominant state party. Its strength 
has not been driven by its popularity or clear vision, but 
has emanated simply from its close association with the 
state administration and control over an elaborate 
patronage system. This monopoly over the political arena 
has been recently challenged and broken by the 
emergence of several pro-reform movements from the 
grass-roots level, which have managed to attract various 
segments of the country’s ‘dormant’ and ‘ineffective’ 
counter-elites and mobilise its ‘silent’ and ‘apathetic’ 
public. Reform movements have been proliferating over a 
relatively short time. In one year, more than 14 pro-
reform movements have emerged in opposition to the 
possibility of renewing Mr Mubarak’s presidency for a 
fifth term and to a hereditary succession. 
‘Change’ seems to be the buzzword or the common 
denominator among all these movements. An inventory of 
the recently formed movements includes: the Kifaya 
movement, the National Rally for Democratic 
Transformation, Journalists for Change, Doctors for 
Change, Intellectuals for Change, Writers for Change, 
Youth for Change, the Association of Egyptian Mothers 
and the Movement of White Ribbons. Obviously these 
groups vary in influence and impact, but their rapid 
growth has several indications. It is a clear sign that the 
existing legal political parties are not effective in 
articulating the demands of the people; that professional 
or particular reform interests cannot be achieved unless 
overall transformation occurs; and that the collective 
momentum for change requires the solidarity of various 
groups. All these forces seem to agree on a clear list of 
demands that call for ending the state of emergency, 
rejecting hereditary succession, holding free and clean 
elections and changing the constitution. The following 
sections address some of these movements for their 
potential future significance, particularly Kifaya and the 
National Rally for Democratic Transformation, as well as 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which has witnessed a clear 
change in its strategy over the past few months.  
The Kifaya movement 
The Kifaya movement appeared in August 2004, as a non-
partisan, umbrella pressure group that reflects the major 
political trends in society. Its founders consist of a wide 
range of political activists, professionals and intellectuals, 
representing the Nasserites, Islamists, liberals and leftists, 
in addition to independents. Kifaya started with the 
formulation of basic reform demands on which all the 
political activists could agree, such as preventing the re-
election of the incumbent president and hereditary rule. It 
also expressed its opposition to any foreign intervention 
in the reform process. Kifaya’s objectives started to 
evolve as the movement gathered initial support from 
different political forces. It decided to take its demands 
directly to the streets. The movement organised its first 
demonstration on 12 February 2005, which has since been 
followed by several more throughout the country. Despite 
its relatively short history and limited influence, last April 
it was able to organise 14 demonstrations in different 
parts of the country in one day. As a sign of further 
evolution, the movement is planning to hold a conference 
on democracy, to which it has invited all the key political 
forces and intellectuals to discuss the future of democracy 
in the country. It is also planning to form popular 
committees to monitor the presidential and parliamentary 
elections.
1 
Since its establishment, the Kifaya movement has become 
the focus of heated controversy. Even some of its 
founders are uncertain about its future or how it will 
evolve. Some question the objectives behind the 
formation of the movement and the reasons for the 
government’s toleration of some of its activities. The 
tamed political parties (those that have accepted to engage 
in a dialogue with the regime) are wary of the movement 
and are keen to discredit it. They consider the movement 
as a sporadic phenomenon and accuse it of being elitist 
and of maintaining foreign links. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, which participates in the movement and its 
demonstrations, expresses reservations regarding the 
language and the slogans used by the movement in these 
events. The Brotherhood also harboura some concerns 
about the possibility that Kifaya may evolve or be used to 
undermine its popular influence and presence among the 
public. In a sign of growing divergence from reality, the 
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government accuses the movement of being foreign-
inspired and of receiving finances from external sources. 
Referring to the Kifaya movement in an interview by Le 
Figaro, President Mubarak stated that “some movements 
are being dropped [in] by the outside”.
2 In an attempt to 
undermine the impact of Kifaya, he hinted that it was easy 
for him to establish a counter-movement in support of the 
regime, entitled ‘mush Kifaya [not enough]’. 
The fact of the matter is that Kifaya is an evolving 
political movement, with genuine concerns for reform and 
for not leaving the political spectrum widely open to the 
manipulation of the regime or the influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. It has adopted effective protest tactics and 
achieved some successes in crystallising agreed-upon 
reform demands. It certainly reflects popular requests for 
change, and that could be a reason for its growing 
influence despite the relatively limited number of its 
supporters (estimated at 3000, mostly through the 
Internet). In addition, the movement has demonstrated 
high skills in using the Arab and foreign media. The 
Kifaya movement phenomenon also reveals the 
ineffectiveness of the existing legal political parties and 
their inability to mobilise the people. This reason may 
explain why ‘tamed’ political parties are suspicious of the 
movement. The movement also presents a clear source of 
pressure on the regime, which has resorted to an 
unconvincing way to discredit the movement through 
accusations of foreign links. In fact, Kifaya is a 
transitional movement with short-term demands and it is 
unlikely that it would evolve into a political party, 
because of the nature of its formation through 
representatives of various political parties. Kifaya 
acknowledges that it has not articulated a comprehensive, 
long-term vision for reform; however, it could become a 
residual force that could assume a monitoring role for the 
process of democratisation in the Egypt and appeal to ‘the 
street’ whenever violations occur. 
The National Rally for Democratic Transition 
Another potentially important movement is the National 
Rally for Democratic Transition. It was created by a 
group of politicians and intellectuals in June 2005. The 
Rally is led by former Prime Minister Aziz Sidqi and 
includes former officials, diplomats, university professors 
and well-known experts in economics, education, 
diplomacy, media and law. In a press conference that was 
attended by more than 100 prominent figures, the group 
appealed to all the national forces to join together for the 
purpose of creating a ‘national front’ to crystallise and 
reach an agreement over a strategic vision of political 
change and democratic transition in Egypt. The founders 
confirmed their intentions not to organise demonstrations 
or compete for power, but to formulate ideas that would 
“rescue Egypt from the current state of stagnation and 
check the alliance of corruption and authoritarianism that 
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blocks reform”.
3 The group eventually seeks to hold a 
general conference of the national and democratic forces 
and form a constituent committee representing all the 
political and intellectual trends. The main task of this 
committee is to write a new constitution for Egypt. It is 
still too soon to assess whether this newly established 
movement will be successful. The most important aspect 
about the group is the idea it stands for and its attempt to 
devise a futuristic vision that would generate the 
agreement of the main political actors. This challenge is 
not an easy one. 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
Many have noticed a clear change in the strategy of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in their relationship with the regime 
and in the reform agenda they have proposed. This change 
was observed in March 2005, when the Muslim 
Brotherhood insisted on carrying out a demonstration to 
demand a faster pace for the reforms and for increasing 
public freedoms. Despite a refusal by Egyptian state 
security to grant permission for the group to demonstrate, 
the Muslim Brotherhood defied the ban and organised a 
‘symbolic’ demonstration in which 10,000 persons 
participated. The government responded with the 
subsequent arrests of hundreds (thousands, according to 
some reports) of the Brotherhood’s followers. The show 
of force by both the state and the Muslim Brotherhood 
seemed to be heading towards a major escalation, or what 
some have already called a ‘bone-crushing phase’.  
In a clear break from past practices, the group refused to 
relent and continued with even larger intermittent 
demonstrations over a period of three weeks. The Muslim 
Brotherhood did not promulgate its usual traditional 
slogans in these demonstrations, but adopted an appealing 
reform agenda that called for ending the state of 
emergency, allowing public freedoms, precipitating the 
pace of reform, holding clean presidential elections under 
total judicial supervision and releasing all political 
detainees (estimated at 20,000). In one day last May, it 
organised 41 ‘surprise’ rallies in which 70,000 persons 
participated in 18 governorates. The surprise element was 
necessary to avoid the pre-emptive arrests of organisers 
and prevent state security from blocking the roads leading 
to the destinations of the demonstrations – a practice state 
security forces have been following recently. The group 
withheld the time and locations of the demonstrations 
from the media, which were only informed on the same 
day. The ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to organise 
these demonstrations despite government harassment 
attests to its organisational skills and popular influence.  
The government considered this continued defiance as a 
clear violation of all its redlines and stepped up its 
crackdown on the group by arresting some of its top 
leadership, particularly those in charge of preparing for 
the Brotherhood’s participation in the coming 
parliamentary elections as well as many of the group’s 
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potential parliamentary candidates. Two days later, the 
group organised another demonstration. That day was 
later dubbed ‘Black Friday’, because of the violent 
confrontations that led to the death of one demonstrator, 
the injury of tens and the arrest of hundreds. This 
prompted the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood 
to threaten “civil disobedience if that was the only way to 
achieve freedom and justice for the Egyptian people” and 
to insist on achieving comprehensive reforms.
4  
The explanations behind the Brotherhood’s change of 
strategy varied. The government, its official media and 
critics of the group tried to attribute this change to 
external pressures. This view was widely publicised in 
order to discredit the group through claims of foreign 
affiliation and clandestine contacts and dialogue between 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the US and the EU. It was 
argued that the Muslim Brotherhood had become 
emboldened by the statements of American officials, 
indicating acceptance of the results of a democratic 
process even if it brings Islamists to power, and by some 
EU officials, who have considered engaging the moderate 
Islamic movements in the reform process. 
Yet it is more likely that the change in the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s strategy is related to the rapid political 
developments and alterations in the balance of power that 
have been taking place in the country over the past year 
and a half. The general political atmosphere has been 
generating new (and reviving old) forces for change and 
reform in which various groups are competing for a place 
and a role. The government and the ‘legal’ opposition 
have opted for the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the most organised popular force. In March 2004, the 
group issued a comprehensive reform initiative that 
reflected a noticeable difference in its language and 
views. The main objective behind this initiative was to 
provide a common ground for discussion and agreement 
on basic reforms, over which the opposition would rally 
against the regime. The legal opposition, however, 
preferred to engage in a ‘national’ dialogue with the 
regime and exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from the 
negotiation process. This dialogue was completely 
manipulated by the regime, which used it to give the 
impression that its intended reform measures had been 
discussed and sanctioned by the opposition. In addition, 
the emergence of new movements (particularly Kifaya), 
which have succeeded in gaining publicity in a relatively 
short time and in acquiring a de facto recognition, must 
have moved the Muslim Brotherhood to try to reassert its 
presence as a significant player and to avoid being 
marginalised or perceived as a non-recognised political 
actor. 
Another probable explanation for the change in the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy is the mounting pressures 
on the government and the feeling that the moment is ripe 
for extracting concessions and gaining new ground from a 
faltering regime. For the past year, the government has 
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been exposed to domestic and external pressures to 
introduce meaningful political reforms and effective 
democratic advances. All its attempts to pay lip-service to 
reform and outmanoeuvre the pressures by introducing 
changes that could be described at this stage as more than 
cosmetic but less than profound have raised the 
expectations of its opponents and made the regime even 
more vulnerable. A calculated show of force and a 
popular presence on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood 
could add to these pressures, helping the group to reach a 
negotiated agreement with the regime that would perhaps 
grant them a larger representation in the next 
parliamentary elections in return for preventing the grass-
roots supporters from plunging into total chaos and 
extremism.  
Notably, even when the tension between the government 
and the Brotherhood was mounting, both exchanged 
direct hints for easing the situation. President Mubarak 
declared in April that he did not hold any enmity towards 
the Muslim Brotherhood and would not mind the group’s 
participation in the political process as members of 
existing parties. The Brotherhood returned this courteous 
gesture. The group continued to confirm that they were 
not seeking to topple the regime and that they were 
interested in a dialogue. The supreme guide, himself a 
member of the Kifaya movement, criticised Kifaya, for 
not showing enough respect to the head of the state and 
for using insulting language against the president. This 
move should not come as a surprise. In fact, it is in the 
interest of both sides to prevent an all-out escalation and 
reach a compromise. The Brotherhood cannot afford the 
destruction of the organisational structures that it has 
worked for years to rebuild. Further, there is no reason for 
the time being to offer itself as the only scapegoat for 
government wrath, particularly in the absence of a 
supportive stance from the liberal and secular opposition. 
Likewise, by crushing the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
government would remove a moderate Islamist movement 
and indirectly contribute to the emergence of radical 
Islamic groups. This scenario is not difficult to imagine, 
taking into consideration the re-emergence of such groups 
and the bombings that took place earlier this year. 
External actors 
Over the past few months, the US and EU have become 
more vocal in their support of real democratic changes 
and political reforms in the region. Unfortunately, the 
signals that the external actors have been sending are 
mixed and in some cases contradictory. There are clear 
inconsistencies and even retreats. To mention but a few 
examples, the regime’s sham constitutional amendment to 
Art. 76 concerning candidates for presidential elections 
has been described as ‘historic’; news about a possible 
EU engagement of moderate Islamic movements has been 
vehemently denied; human rights violations are 
selectively condemned. More importantly, and perhaps 
disappointingly, it is not yet clear which side either of 
these two external actors has decided to support: that of 
stability with reformed autocrats or change with EGYPT’S MOMENT OF REFORM | 5 
 
unreliable reformers. There are growing indications that 
the choice might be ‘change with stability’. Ironically, 
that is exactly the slogan that the autocratic rulers in the 
region have been expounding for a long time. 
The Egyptian government has been exploiting this state of 
indecisiveness to pit domestic and external actors against 
each other. It has intimidated the pro-reform movements 
and the independent, non-governmental organisations by 
raising issues of national sovereignty, violation of the 
country’s independence and even treason. The official 
press is accusing Kifaya of foreign funding and the 
president himself has threatened to take action against the 
Muslim Brotherhood upon proof that it has had contacts 
with external actors. Meanwhile, the regime continues to 
use the Islamist threat as a scarecrow to fend off the US 
and the EU. This strategy seems to be working. Almost all 
the pro-reform forces have gone at length to deny any 
foreign contacts and even condemn any external attempt 
to bring about reforms, despite that the fact that this could 
run against their interests in the long run. 
Nevertheless, external actors can play a role in supporting 
the pro-reform movement. They can: 
•  limit the government’s ability to circumvent reform 
and outmanoeuvre the demands for effective and 
substantive democratic changes; 
•  send clear, unequivocal signals to the regime that 
they would not allow it to crush the opposition or 
violate basic human and public rights (the right to 
demonstrate, articulate demands, assemble, form 
political parties, etc.); 
•  urge the state to include all the non-violent and 
moderate groups in the political process; 
•  support the demands of Egyptian judges for ensuring 
the independence of the judiciary; 
•  insist on free and clean presidential and parliamentary 
elections; and 
•  support effective, independent domestic monitoring 
of the elections. 
This task has to be handled in a highly diplomatic way. In 
general, the pro-reform forces are suspicious of US and 
EU intentions. There is a strong objection to any possible 
outside interference. Some may even fear that the external 
actors might be contemplating a forceful regime change, 
which, despite opposition to the government, is 
unacceptable. 
Obstacles to the democratic spring 
The movement towards transition can turn into a 
democratic spring or a democratic mirage. It faces several 
challenges that could arrest this potential opportunity for 
transformation. A major challenge is that the regime 
might succeed in aborting this momentum for change by 
striking a deal with the US and the EU. The government 
could plea for a transitional phase to introduce gradual 
reforms in return for maintaining stability. Such an 
initiative could be carried out through appropriating some 
of the demands of the opposition, yet adapting them to 
legalise the continuation of certain restrictions and 
maximising the gains. A good case in point is the 
constitutional amendment to Art. 76. It scuppered a major 
demand of the opposition to prevent hereditary succession 
and ensure competitive presidential elections by 
introducing a structural change that legalises the 
ascendancy of Gamal Mubarak to power in a nominally 
competitive presidential election, in which, given the 
conditionalities of the amendment, only the candidate of 
the official state party can stand a chance. In a similar 
vein, the new package of laws that the regime has recently 
proposed for the parliament, presidential elections, party 
formation and the practice of political rights promise only 
superficial changes. 
Another major obstacle is the lack, so far, of a clear 
alternative to the existing regime either at the level of a 
popular presidential candidate backed by the opposition 
or a future political alternative. It is true that the pro-
reform movements are in agreement on a short-term list 
of reform demands. This is a remarkable achievement that 
should not be undermined. But the problem is ‘what 
next?’. Most of the proposed demands are partial 
measures for reform. Admittedly, the regime is in no 
other position but to respond to the mounting domestic 
pressures; however, it will do so in its own manipulative 
way. Will that be enough to achieve a democratic reform 
or must a real transfer of power come about? Are the pro-
reform movements ready – with candidates, programmes 
and alternatives – for such a possibility? This situation 
really calls for a national conference that includes all the 
pro-reform forces in the country to debate and formulate a 
future vision and concrete alternatives for the country. In 
fact, the Muslim Brotherhood, Kifaya and the National 
Rally for Democratic Transition have all called for such a 
step. 
This last point raises a number of concerns. The 
multiplicity of reform movements with similar demands, 
but different objectives, can easily generate competition, 
discord and potential fragmentation of the reform 
momentum. It also underscores the continued absence of 
a mainstream organisation that can aggregate the bulk of 
these objectives and represent the majority of the public. 
Despite the coordination between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other pro-reform movements, tension 
transpires every now and then. It is natural at this stage 
that many of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
feel disappointed by the inadequate support given to them 
by other movements, despite the fact that they have been 
subjected to government condemnation the most. 
Undoubtedly, the regime will not spare any opportunity to 
create divisions and fragment its opponents. It will use its 
typical tactics of selective repression, toleration and co-
option in order to break down their temporary and fragile 
unity. 
A serious obstacle to a democratic transition is the 
possible loss of control and deterioration of the situation 
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possible scenario could arise if the government insists on 
repressing the moderate opposition. In a transitional 
process, both the regime and the pro-reform movements 
should have an interest in avoiding an all-out escalation 
that could turn the process into a violent one. Such an 
escalation would give radical elements the opportunity to 
sabotage the entire reform movement. Radical forces 
within the government could use the pretext of the spread 
of violence for repression in order to restore stability; a 
radical opposition could easily undermine the moderates 
and validate arguments to resort to violence. 
Structural changes and institutional safeguards 
It is impossible to build a democratic system on 
authoritarian structures and dynamics. The existing 
constitution, state structures and political culture in Egypt 
would turn the most idealist of democrats into a 
repressive dictator. The system has a history-old tradition 
of making ‘pharaohs’. In addition, the existing distrust 
and mutual fear among almost all the players, regime and 
pro-reform forces alike, cannot be addressed by good 
intentions alone. Likewise, the practice of guilt by 
association unfairly excludes an important group, namely 
the moderate Islamists, from the right of inclusion in the 
political process. All this calls for the need to construct 
institutional guarantees and strong safeguards that would 
prevent any force – radical Islamic, radical secular or a 
military junta – from sabotaging any future democratic 
gains.  
Most likely, Mr Mubarak’s regime will continue for a 
term or less, depending on his state of health and his 
government’s ability to handle the domestic pressures. 
The pro-reform movements should use this transitional 
phase to continue to push for: 1) dismantling the 
structures of authoritarianism; and 2) constructing 
structural safeguards. They seem to be clear about the first 
step. It is the second step, however, that needs some 
elaboration.  
Democracy by nature allows for different visions and 
perspectives. The expectation that an agreement must be 
reached on a universal vision for the future of the country 
is closer to totalitarianism than democracy. This is exactly 
where the role of political parties comes in, as they 
compete for support for their particular visions and plans. 
In other words, each party has the right to have and 
propose its vision, with the voters being the decisive 
element. Yet, a successful transition requires agreement 
on certain political practices and processes, which could 
be enshrined in a national charter for political action or in 
a new constitution. Such a charter cannot avoid 
addressing three main issues: identity, economic growth 
and public liberties (citizenship rights). It has to secure 
the consent of all political forces, regardless of their 
orientations, on principles concerning the transfer of 
power, free and fair elections, the condemnation of 
violence, respect for public and individual freedoms, the 
freedom of association, an independent judiciary and de-
politicisation of the military. These measures could 
provide assurances to all the political forces that they can 
have a chance to compete in a stable and fair process.    
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•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 